

Message Text

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TO ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

XMT AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

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FOLLOWING REPEAT DAR ES SALAAM 3414 ACTION LUSAKA, INFO SECSTATE DTD
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QTE: UNCLAS DAR ES SALAAM 3414

LUSAKA PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY FOR EAGLEBURGER AND WISNER

E.O. 11652 N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.) TZ

SUBJ: NYERERE NEWS CONFERENCE

FOLLOWING IS UNOFFICIAL TEXT OF NYERERE NEWS CONFERENCE

AT DAR ES SALAAM STATE HOUSE SEPTEMBER 15, 1976:

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PRESS CONFERENCE BY NYERERE, STATE HOUSE, DAR ES SALAAM
SEPTEMBER 15, 1976

NYERERE SPOKESMAN: MEMBERS OF THE PRESS: YOU HEARD THAT, SINCE WE HAVE ISSUED A PAPER YESTERDAY WHICH WE TRUST YOU HAVE LOOKED THROUGH, THE PRESIDENT IS AVAILABLE FOR THIS PRESS CONFERENCE HERE AND WE WILL HOPE THAT YOUR QUESTIONS WILL ARISE MAINLY FROM THAT PAPER AND ANY OTHERS WHICH ARE RELEVANT TO IT. AS I SAID EARLIER, WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOUR HANDS UP SO THAT WE CAN HAVE THE FIRST QUESTION.

Q. (REUTERS). DOES YOUR COUNTRY SERIOUSLY EXPECT THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL GIVE ANY SORT OF MILITARY AID TO THE BLACK GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS FIGHTING IN RHODESIA OR NAMIBIA?

A. NO

Q. TANZANIA HAS NOW SAID IT WANTS U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IF NEGOTIATIONS FAIL. DID YOU GET THIS FROM DR. KISSINGER?

A. WE ARE SAYING -- DO YOU REALIZE THAT I AM AVOIDING TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTION, YES OR NO? WE ARE SAYING THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE THAT DR. KISSINGER IS WELCOME BOTH IN DAR ES SALAAM AND IN PRETORIA FOR THE SAME REASONS. THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE. WE WELCOME DR. KISSINGER BECAUSE HE HAS SAID CLEARLY THAT THE UNITED STATES IS WILLING TO ACCEPT MAJORITY RULE, AND THESE EFFORTS ARE FOR THE PURPOSE OF SEEING WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA PEACEFULLY. WELL, FINE, THIS IS GOOD. WE ARE SAYING ALSO THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS SEE U.S. EFFORTS AS A REALIZATION OF THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA AND HOW IMPORTANT IT IS THAT SOUTHERN AFRICA BE SAVED FROM COMMUNISM. AND OF COURSE THE UNITED STATES IS SLIGHTLY CONCERNED ABOUT COMMUNISM. SO IT'S JUST POSSIBLE THAT WE WHEREAS WELCOME DR. KISSINGER FOR MAJORITY RULE, PRETORIA WELCOMES DR. KISSINGER AS AN ALLY AGAINST COMMUNISM. BUT THEIR DEFINITION OF COMMUNISM IS ANYBODY WHO IS FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM. SO WE ARE SAYING, SINCE BECAUSE THERE IS THIS POSSIBILITY OF AMBIGUITY, IT WOULD BE A VERY GOOD THING IF THE U.S. COULD SAY: "WE DON'T REGARD EVERYBODY WHO IS FIGHTING FOR THE FREEDOM OF HIS COUNTRY, OR WHO HAS BEEN FORCED TO TAKE UP ARMS TO FIGHT FOR THE FREEDOM OF HIS

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COUNTRY, IS A COMMUNIST; AND IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA BY PEACEFUL MEANS, WE WILL CERTAINLY NOT HELP THOSE WHO ARE OPPOSING MAJORITY RULE." NOW, I HAVE NOT ANSWERED YOUR QUESTION. THIS IS UNDERSTOOD BY THE UNITED STATES. IT IS UP TO THE UNITED STATES TO GIVE THAT ASSURANCE. AND ACTUALLY, THE ASSURANCE DOES NOT HAVE TO BE GIVEN TO ME AT ALL. IT NEEDS TO BE GIVEN TO THE PEOPLE OF TANZANIA (SOUTH AFRICA). Q. (UPI). TWO QUESTIONS, PLEASE. ONE, DID

YOUR TALKS

TODAY, DO YOU THINK, PROGRESS THE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA; AND, TWO, DID THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES -- EITHER DR. KISSINGER OR ANY OF HIS STAFF AIDES -- GIVE YOU ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THEY THINK THE DURATION OF IAN SMITH AND HIS REGIME IS LIMITED AND WILL SOON END?

A. TO ANSWER THIS LAST QUESTION FIRST. I THINK IT'S PROBABLY EASIER, I THINK THERE IS AGREEMENT, REALIZATION, THAT IN THE CASE OF RHODESIA PROGRESS DEPENDS UPON WHETHER SMITH ACCEPTS MAJORITY RULE. IF SMITH DOES NOT ACCEPT MAJORITY RULE, THEN OF COURSE WE ARE SAYING OUR FIGHT WILL CONTINUE. BUT I THINK THERE IS A REALIZATION THAT REALLY OUR BATTLE WILL CONTINUE. THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT -- CERTAINLY, DR. KISSINGER HAS NOT TOLD ME THAT HE THINKS SMITH IS GOING TO BE OUT OF THE WAY SOON. HE DID NOT GIVE ME THAT IMPRESSION AT ALL.

Q. DID ANY OF HIS AIDES ---

A. NO, WELL, I HAVEN'T HAD PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH ANY OF HIS AIDES. BUT NOBODY HAS GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT SMITH IS GOING TO BE OUT OF THE WAY, OR THAT SMITH IS NOW CONVINCED ABOUT MAJORITY RULE. IN ACTUAL FACT, I THINK TWO DAYS AGO SMITH SAID IN SOUTH AFRICA THAT HE DOES NOT ACCEPT POLITICAL GIMMICKS LIKE MAJORITY RULE. THAT WAS HIS STATEMENT ONLY 48 OR 36 HOURS AGO. HE IS STILL CLINGING TO MINORITY RULE. SO WHEN YOU SAY, HAVE WE MADE PROGRESS, TO GO BACK TO YOUR FIRST QUESTION, WHAT IS PROGRESS BETWEEN MYSELF AND DR. KISSINGER? WE CAN ONLY EXCHANGE VIEWS; WE ARE NOT NEGOTIATING. I CAN ONLY EXPLAIN THE CONDITIONS UPON WHICH IT IS POSSIBLE TO GET NATIONALISTS TO TALKS. WELL, I HAVE EXPLAINED, AND I AM SURE DR. KISSINGER HAS UNDERSTOOD. SO IF YOU CALL THAT PROGRESS, IT'S PROGRESS. HE HAS UNDERSTOOD THIS POSITION. WHETHER VORSTER WILL

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UNDERSTAND -- I SUPPOSE HE WILL UNDERSTAND. BUT WHAT HIS RESPONSE IS GOING TO BE TO THAT UNDERSTANDING IS A DIFFERENT MATTER.

Q. (TIME MAGAZINE). MR. PRESIDENT, IN YOUR FIRST ANSWER YOU INDICATED THAT YOU DID NOT EXPECT THE U.S. TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. BUT THE STATEMENT YESTERDAY USED THE TERM "THE WHEREWITHAL TO CARRY ON THE STRUGGLE." COULD YOU ELABORATE WHAT YOU MEAN BY "WHEREWITHAL?"

A. IF I READ THAT STATEMENT CORRECTLY, WE WERE NOT ASKING THE U.S. TO GIVE US THE ARMS. WE WILL GET ARMS FROM ANOTHER SIDE. AND THIS IS NOT BECAUSE WE DON'T WANT ARMS FROM THE U.S. BUT BECAUSE WE ARE REALISTS, WE DON'T WANT TO EMBARRASS THE U.S. THE U.S. WILL NOT GIVE US ARMS. SO WHY ASK THEM? ACTUALLY, I THINK AT ONE TIME, IN MY INNOCENCE, I DID TRY.

BUT NOW I'M LESS INNOCENT; I DON'T TRY. SO WE ARE NOT ASKING FOR ARMS FROM THE U.S. AND REALISTICALLY WE ARE SAYING: IF THE U.S. UNDERSTANDS THAT WE GENUINELY DON'T WANT FIGHTING; WE ARE ONLY FORCED TO FIGHT FOR OUR FREEDOM; THAT WE HAVE TRIED TO ACHIEVE INDEPENDENCE WITHOUT FIGHTING. I HAVE SAT WITH SOUTH AFRICAN OFFICIALS, YOU KNOW, IN AN ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA WITHOUT FIGHTING. I FNEW WHAT VORSTER WANTED. SOME UNKIND PEOPLE CALL IT A BANTUSTAN; HE WANTED A BANTUSTAN IN RHODESIA. WE FAILED BECAUSE SMITH WAS NOT CONVINCED. WE HAD TO TURN TO FIGHTING. WHEN WE TURNED TO FIGHTING WE WANT ARMS. IF WE DON'T GET ARMS FROM THE WESTERN WORLD, WE GET THEM WHEREVER WE CAN GET THEM. SO WE FIGHT BECAUSE SMITH FORCES US TO FIGHT. WE TAKE COMMUNIST ARMS BECAUSE THIS IS THE ONLY SOURCE WHERE WE CAN GET ARMS FROM. SO IF YOU ASK ME A QUESTION, ARE YOU GOING TO GET ARMS FROM, DO YOU THINK, DO YOU EXPECT SERIOUSLY TO GET ARMS FROM THE UNITED STATES. I SAY NO. WE ARE NOT EVEN ASKING. WHY SHOULD WE EMBARRASS THEM. WE ASK THEM IF WE ARE FORCED TO FIGHT, WE ASK THEM TO UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE NOT COMMUNISTS BECAUSE WE HAVE TO FIGHT FOR OUR FREEDOM AND BECAUSE ONLY COMMUNISTS CAN GIVE US ARMS. THAT IS ALL WE ARE ASKING.

Q. (ASSOCIATED PRESS). HAVE YOU SUGGESTED TO DR. KISSINGER THAT YOU MIGHT MEET REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ZIPA HIGH COMMAND?

A. NO.

Q. (ABC), BASED ON YOUR CONVERSATIONS TODAY WITH
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SEC. KISSINGER, DO YOU FEEL THAT MR. VORSTER IS PREPARED TO MAKE ANY KIND OF CONCESSIONS WHICH MAKE THE CONTINUATION OF THIS DIPLOMATIC EFFORT WORTHWHILE? I ASSUME HE HAS GIVEN YOU A REPORT ON HIS TALKS WITH VORSTER LAST WEEK.

A. I THINK THE FRANK ANSWER IS NO. I'LL BE ABLE TO FIND OUT AFTER DR. KISSINGER HAS SEEN VORSTER AGAIN. BUT THE FRANK ANSWER IS THAT I DON'T FEEL PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGED BUT ONE MUST WAIT UNTIL DR. KISSINGER HAS SEEN VORSTER AGAIN.

Q. (BBC). HAS THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE MEETING BETWEEN DR. KISSINGER AND MR. SMITH CROPPED UP, AND IF IT DID CROP UP, WHAT DO YOU FEEL ABOUT IT?

A. I DON'T KNOW HOW I SHOULD ANSWER THAT ONE. IT DID CROP UP. BUT MY OWN FEELING IS, WHAT IS THE POINT OF MEETING SMITH? WHAT DO YOU MEET SMITH TO DISCUSS? I DON'T KNOW. CERTAINLY IT DID CROP UP, BUT ...

Q. (HEARST NEWSPAPERS). IF I MAY FOLLOW THAT UP, DON'T YOU BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR DR. KISSINGER AT SUCH A MEETING TO PUT PRESSURE ON PRIME MINISTER SMITH TO YIELD TO THE PRINCIPLE OF MAJORITY RULE?

A. WELL, LOOK, I ...THE UNITED STATES WILL JUDGE HOW MUCH PRESSURE THEY CAN PUT ON WHOM. IF THE

UNITED STATES FELT THEY THOUGHT THE BEST WAY TO GET SMITH TO ACCEPT MAJORITY RULE IS TO TALK, THEZ ARE THE JUDGES. BUT QUITE FRANKLY I BELIEVE, I'M SAYING, I KEEP ON SAYING THAT...THESE TALKS ARE DOUBLE-EDGED. THEY CAN BE INTERPRETED ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. THEY HAVE THE POSITIVE AND THE NEGATIVE. AND THERE IS NOT THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT VORSTER IS VERY HAPPY THAT NOW HE IS CALLED BY DR. KISSINGER IN GERMANY, THEN IN SWITZERLAND, AND NOW DR. KISSINGER HIMSELF IS GOING TO PRETORIA. THIS IS VERY GOOD FOR VORSTER. VORSTER IS BECOMING A WORLD STATESMAN. IF THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO ADD TO THIS LIST, THEY WANT TO ADD SMITH ALSO, FINE. BUT, REALLY, I CAN'T SEE THAT AFRICA'S REACTION IS GOING TO BE PARTICULARLY FAVORABLE TO THAT KIND OF MEETING.

Q. (WASHINGTON POST). IN THE STATEMENT ISSUED YESTERDAY, SIR, IT DISCUSSED POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ELEMENTS OF DR. KISSINGER' DIPLOMACY. AT THE SAME TIME, YOUR GOVERNMENT IS REPORTED TO TAKE THE UNCLASSIFIED

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BASIC POSITION THAT DR. KISSINGER SHOULD STAY OUT OF THE RHODESIAN SITUATION, THAT IT IS UNTIMELY FOR NEGOTIATIONS. WOULD YOU PLEASE CLARIFY; WHAT IS YOUR PREFERENCE? WOULD YOU LIKE DR. KISSINGER TO STAY OUT OF THE RHODESIAN NEGOTIATIONS OR TO PARTICIPATE IN THE RHODESIAN NEGOTIATIONS?

A. I WAS NOT QUITE SURE THAT DR. KISSINGER WAS INTENDING TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY RHODESIAN NEGOTIATIONS AT ALL. I'VE ALWAYS BELIEVED, BUT YOU MAY WANT TO CHECK WITH DR. KISSINGER BECAUSE I CAN'T SPEAK FOR DR. KISSINGER. I THOUGHT DR. KISSINGER WAS TRYING TO DISCOVER WHETHER THERE ARE CONDITIONS ON WHICH THE TRUE ACTORS IN THE RHODESIAN SITUATION WOULD ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS. I DIDN'T REALLY BELIEVE THAT DR. KISSINGER WAS GOING TO NEGOTIATE. NEGOTIATE ABOUT WHAT? THE UNITED STATES IS NOT THE COLONIAL POWER IN RHODESIA. I DON'T KNOW WHAT THEY WANT TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT. I THOUGHT THEY WERE TRYING TO FIND OUT USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO FIND OUT, WHETHER CONDITIONS COULD BE CREATED WHEREBY THOSE WHO MUST NEGOTIATE WOULD THEN NEGOTIATE.

Q. I REALIZE THAT, SIR, BUT AT THE SAME TIME IN EXPRESSING POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS, COULD YOU CLARIFY IN ANY WAY WHERE YOU COME DOWN? DO YOU REGARD DR. KISSINGER'S INTERVENTION IN THE SITUATION AS, ON BALANCE, POSITIVE OR EGATIVE?

A. AND I AMY SAYING THAT THE DECISION WILL BE THAT OF THE UNITED STATES. I AM SAYING THE UNITED STATES WILL DECIDE. SUPPOSING THERE ARE NO NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE FIGHTING, FOR INSTANCE, IN THE CASE OF RHODESIA,

FIGHTING IS TAKING PLACE. NOW SUPPOSING DR. KISSINGER
DISCOVERS IN THE NEXT WEEK OR TWO THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE
NOT POSSIBLE AND AFRICA SAYS, FINALLY, IF NEGOTIATIONS
ARE NOT POSSIBLE THE WAR MUST CONTINUE. DON'T ASK ME
THE QUESTION. YOU ASK DR. KISSINGER. WHAT WILL THE UNITED
STATES DO? WILL THEY OPPOSE THE MEN WITH THE GUNS?
DON'T ASK ME. OR WILL THEY SAY THEY UNDERSTAND WHY, EVEN
IF THEY DON'T SUPPORT THEM, THEY UNDERSTAND WHY THEY HAVE TO
FIGHT BECAUSE THERE IS NO OTHER WAY IN WHICH THEY
CAN ACHIEVE THEIR INDEPENDENCE. SO, I'M SAYING, PLEASE DON'T ASK
ME. I WILL NOT DECIDE FOR THE UNITED STATES WHICH PACKAGE
IS GOING TO BE HEAVIER, THE POSITIVE OR THE NEGATIVE.
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Q. (NBC). ONE, WHY ARE YOU NOT ENCOURAGED BY THE TALKS
YOU'VE HAD WITH DR. KISSINGER ABOUT FURTHER PROGRESS BEING
MADE, ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT BOTH RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA, AND
IN FOLLOW-UP TO A PREVIOUS QUESTION IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING
THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER HAS BEEN MEETING WITH
MR. VORSTER AT YOUR REQUEST AND AT THE REQUEST OF OTHER
PRESIDENTS. IS THAT TRUE?

A. WHY AM I NOT ENCOURAGED? IN THE CASE OF RHODESIA I WOULD
BE ENCOURAGED IF I HAD BEEN TOLD AS A RESULT OF THE
MEETINGS BETWEEN DR. KISSINGER AND VORSTER, IT IS
NOW CLEAR THAT MR. SMITH IS WILLING TO ACCEPT MAJORITY
RULE AT THE VERY LEAST ON THE PLAN ANNOUNCED BY
CALLAGHAN, I WOULD SAY "AH" WELL, THAT'S ENCOURAGING. WELL
I HAVE NOT HEARD ANYTHING OF THE KIND. AND THEREFORE
I DON'T SEE ANYTHING TO THE CONTRARY. THE POSITION FOR
ME IS AS IT WAS IN 1974. ON THE CASE OF NAMIBIA,
THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE HAD SOMETHING THEY CALL A CONFERENCE
IN WINDHOEK, A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. IT TURNS OUT
THIS CONFERENCE WAS ACTUALLY A CONFERENCE OF CHIEFS. THE
CHIEFS WERE DISCUSSING SOMETHING AND NATURALLY WE NEVER TOOK
IT SERIOUSLY. I'D FEEL ENCOURAGED IF I FELT NOW THAT
SOUTH AFRICA, I'D BEEN TOLD THAT SOUTH AFRICA NOW
ACCEPTS THAT THAT CONFERENCE IS NO GOOD, WE'LL HAVE TO
HAVE A CONFERENCE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVES OF NAMIBIA
ACCEPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE OAU WILL PARTICIPATE
THAT'S SWAPO. AH, THEN I'D SAY "AH, THAT'S ENCOURAGING."
AND IT'S NOT ENOUGH FOR ME TO HEAR THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS
ARE SAYING, YES, SWAPO IS ONE OF TWENTY. NO, NO, NO, NO.
THE UNITED NATIONS IS NOT SAYING SWAPO IS ONE OF TWENTY.
THE UNITED NATIONS IS SAYING SWAPO REPRESENTS THE PEOPLE OF
NAMIBIA. IF I HEARD THAT SOUTH AFRICA WAS ON THE
VERGE OF ACCEPTING THIS FACT OF LIFE, I WOULD SAY, YES,
THERE LOOKS TO BE SOME PROGRESS. I HAVEN'T HEARD THAT
SOUTH AFRICA APPEARS TO ACCEPT THE IMPORTANCE OF
SWAPO. THAT'S WHY I'M SAYING, REALLY, ON THE BASIS OF WHAT I
KNOW UNTIL NOW, I COULD EVEN SAY I AM LESS HOPEFUL THAN

I WAS.

Q. WOULD YOU PLEASE ANSWER THE OTHER PART OF THE QUESTION?

A. WHICH WAS, SIR?

Q. WHERE I SAID YOU HAVE BEEN COMPLAINING ABOUT THE FACT THAT DR. KISSINGER'S MEETING WITH VORSTER WAS ENHANCING THE UNCLASSIFIED

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PRESTIGE OF MR. VORSTER. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER HAS BEEN MEETING WITH MR. VORSTER AT YOUR REQUEST AND AT THE REQUEST OF OTHER AFRICAN PRE-SIDENTS?

A. WE HAVE NOT DISCOURAGED DR. KISSINGER FROM MEETING VORSTER, LET ME PUT IT THAT WAY.

Q. MR. PRESIDENT, COULD YOU EXPLAIN TO US WHAT YOU REGARD THE INTENTIONS OR REASONS FOR A CONSITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN GENEVA AND WHAT ELEMENTS SHOULD BE PRESENT AND WHETHER DR. KISSINGER HAS BEEN ALERTED ALONG THOSE LINES THAT YOU FEEL ARE NECESSARY?

A. WELL, LOOK. LET ME BE COMPLETELY FRANK. I HAVE EXPLAINED TO DR. KISSINGER WHAT I BELIEVE, WHO I BELIEVE ARE THE CHIEF PARTICIPANTS IN A PLAUSIBLE, AND AACCEPTABLE CONFERENCE, IN GENEVA. I'VE EXPLAINED IT VERY CLEARLY TO DR. KISSINGER. HE HAS UNDERSTOOD. AND I'LL WAIT FOR DR. KISSINER TO TELL US LATER WHETHER SOUTH AFRICA ACCPETS THIS. BUT I CAN'T SAY ANY MORE.

Q. I'M A FREELANCE JOURNALIST HERE. TODAY'S DAILY NEWS SAID THAT THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF IS INEVITABLE. IS THAT THE POSITION OF THE FRONT-LINE STATES, AND IF SO, WHAT IS THE OAU LIBERATION COMMITTEE DOING IN PREPARATION FOR GOING TO ITS SIDE?

A. WE WERE DISCUSSING RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA.

Q. (CHICAGO TRIBUNE). YOU'VE EXPRESSED WHAT SOME OF US FEEL A GREAT DEAL ...(INAUDIBLE) IN YOUR (INAUDIBLE) AND I WONDER IF YOU CAN TELL US WHAT YOU THINK NOW DR. KISSINGER'S VISIT TO AFRICA CAN ACCOMPLISH, AND WHAT YOU THINK IT MIGHT ACCOMPLISH?

A. IT CAN CLARIFY ISSUES. THERE IS REALLY, LET'S BE COMPLETELY FAIR TO DR. KISSINGER AND THE UNITED STATES. THE BRITISH AT ONE TIME DID TRY TO TALK. THEY FAILED. WE DID IN '74. WE FAILED. THE UNITED STATES ARE NEWCOMERS IN THIS. THEY HAVE MORE POWER THAN THE BRITISH HAVE. AND CERTAINLY THEY HAVE MORE POWER THAN TANZANIA HAS. THEY'D LIKE TO HAVE A GO AT IT. IT' PROPER THAT THEY SHOULD. AND IF THEY COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT REALLY THERE IS NO POSSIBLITY OF ACHIEVING MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA PEACEFULLY, WELL AT LEAST THEY WILL HAVE ACHIEVED A CLARITY AND A BASIS ON WHICH WE UNCLASSIFIED

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CAN UNDERSTAND WHY THERE IS ONLY ONE WAY WHICH IS OPEN TO AFRICANS TO ACHIEVE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THEIR COUNTRY. AT LEAST THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE PROVED THIS FOR THEMSELVES FIRST HAND. THAT'S SOME ACHIEVEMENT FOR US; CERTAINLY, THAT WILL BE SOME ACHIEVEMENT.

Q. MR. PRESIDENT I REALIZE THAT THIS IS A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION, BUT IF MR. SMITH DOES ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA, WOULD TANZANIA AND, DO YOU BELIEVE, THE OTHER FRONT-LINE STATES BE WILLING TO REDUCE GRADUALLY OVER A PERIOD OF TIME THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE GUERRILLA STRUGGLE ON RHODESIA'S BORDERS?

A. SMITH SAYS WE ACCEPT MAJORITY RULE. FINE. TO SMITH WHAT IS MAJORITY RULE IS NOT MAJORITY RULE. AND THEN I EXPECT, AGAIN, I'M BEING COMPLETELY HYPOTHETICAL, I'M ANSWERING A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. SMITH SAYS, SUPPOSING SMITH SAYS AND I THINK IT WILL BE A MIRACLE IF HE DOES, SUPPOSING HE DOES SAY, YES, WE DO ACCEPT WHAT CALLAGHAN SAYS, MAJORITY RULE IN TWO YEARS, IN 18 MONTHS, TWO YEARS TIME OR LESS, SOMETHING LIKE THAT. LET'S NOW START WITH THE PROCESS. HYPOTHETICALLY, WHAT HAPPENS, WHAT I WOULD EXPECT TO HAPPEN, IS THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD THEN CALL A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE WITH THE NECESSARY PEOPLE, INCLUDING THE NATIONALIST LEADERS. THEY WOULD AGREE ON A FUTURE CONSTITUTION. THEY WOULD ESTABLISH A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. THEY WOULD ESTABLISH A CHISSANO GOVERNMENT. AT THAT POINT I BELIEVE AT THE POINT AT WHICH WE ESTABLISH A CHISSANO GOVERNMENT HOW SOON THAT HAPPENS DEPENDS ON THE LENGTH OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS IN LONDON OR WHEREVER THEY HOLD IT. AT THE POINT AT WHICH YOU ESTABLISH THE CHISSANO GOVERNMENT, NATURALLY, I WOULD EXPECT THAT FIGHTING CEASES.

Q. MR. PRESIDENT, LET US ASSUME, AS THE STATEMENT DID YESTERDAY, THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT BECAME INVOLVED SOLELY OUT OF FEAR OF COMMUNISM. IF THAT INVOLVEMENT NONETHELESS HELPS PAVE THE WAY FOR NEGOTIATIONS, DOES THAT MAKE IT WRONG?

A. NO. NO. BUT I'M ONLY SAYING, IF THE UNITED STATES IS SOLELY PUSHED BY FEAR OF COMMUNISM AND NEGOTIATIONS FAIL TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT, THEN THE UNITED STATES WILL FIND THEMSELVES FORCED TO BE ALLIES OF THOSE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WHO CLAIM THAT THEY'RE FIGHTING COMMUNISM. I AM STATING A POLITICAL FACT.

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A. MR. PRESIDENT, (NEWSWEEK). YOU SUGGESTED IN EFFECT A MOMENT AGO THAT YOU FEEL THAT IT WILL TAKE A MIRACLE TO ACHIEVE A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THE

RHODESIAN QUESTION. DO YOU FEEL THAT IT WILL
SIMILARLY TAKE A MIRACLE TO ACHIEVE A RESOLUTION
ACCEPTABLE TO YOURSELF AND THE FRONT-LINE STATES ON
THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION?

A. ON THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION?

Q. YES.

A. WE WANT INDEPENDENCE. WHY IS INDEPENDENCE A MIRACLE?
MY COUNTRY IS INDEPENDENT. I DIDN'T BECOME INDEPENDENT
HERE AS THE RESULT OF A MIRACLE.. WE WANT INDE-
PENDENCE. I'M SAYING IT WOULD BE... LOOK. I'M SAYING
IT WOULD BE A MIRACLE IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS SAY WE ARE
PULLING OUT TOMORROW. I'D BE VERY HAPPY. THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE
BEEN ASKING THEM TO PULL OUT FOR AGES. LET THEM PULL OUT.
I'M SAYING WHAT DO WE KNOW, WE KNOW THE SOUTH AFRICANS.
IF YOU THINK SIR, THEY ARE GOING TO PULL OUT, FINE.

Q. DO YOU FEEL IT WILL REQUIRE A MIRACLE FOR
A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THAT TO COME OUT OF THE
CURRENT SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY.

A. WOULD YOU LIKE TO REPEAT THAT QUESTION?

Q. I'M SORRY I DIDN'T HEAR YOU SIR.

A. WOULD YOU LIKE TO REPEAT THE QUESTION?

A. AT ONE TIME, I WAS MORE HOPEFUL ON NAMIBIA. I'M NOT NOW.

Q. MR. PRESIDENT, IF THIS PRESENT EFFORT DOES FAIL, IF
WE DO HAVE A MUCH LARGER WAR GOING ON, HOW WOULD
TANZANIA FEEL ABOUT CUBAN TROOPS SUPPORTED BY THE SOVIET UNION
ASSISTING THE GUERRILLAS IN RHODESIA?

A. ACTUALLY, FRANKLY, I'M FED UP WITH CUBAN TROOPS AND ...
WHAT IS THIS BUSINESS? I DON'T LIKE THIS OBSESSION WITH
CUBA. WE FOUGHT IN MOZAMBIQUE FOR 10 YEARS. DID WE
HAVE CUBANS? YOU KNOW, YOU PEOPLE IN THE MEDIA, YOU KNEW,
WE FOUGHT FOR 10 YEARS IN MOZAMBIQUE; DID WE HAVE CUBANS?
WE FOUGHT IN ANGOLA; DID WE HAVE CUBANS? DID WE HAVE THE
ASSISTANCE OF CUBANS IN WINNING THE WAR IN ANGOLA? DID WE?
SO WHY THIS BUSINESS OF CUBA, CUBA. CUBA WE NEVER ASKED THE
CUBANS TO FIGHT IN ANGOLA OR IN MOZAMBIQUE. NEVER*

Q. WELL, THERE WERE 15,000 TROOPS REPORTED TO BE IN
ANGOLA...

A. BECAUSE, SIR, THE SOUTH AFRICANS INVADED AN INDEPENDENT
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AFRICAN STATE. SO, WHAT DID YOU EXPECT ANGOLA TO DO?
IT WAS NOT A LIBERATION WAR. IT WAS AFTER THAT COUNTRY
HAD BECOME AN INDEPENDENT STATE. SO WHAT DO YOU EXPECT?

Q. THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE WITHDRAWN. WHY HAVE NOT THE CUBANS?

A. DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE TROOPS IN EUROPE?

Q. AND SO HAVE THE RUSSIANS.

A. AND SO HAVE THE RUSSIANS. SO WHY ARE YOU ASKING ME THIS
QUESTION? ANGOLA IS A STATE AS INDEPENDENT AS THE
UNITED STATES. AND GERMANY IS AS INDEPENDENT. WHY ARE THE
AMERICANS THERE? DON'T ASK ME THESE QUESTIONS OF THE

SUPER POWERS. YOU GO AND ASK THE SUPER POWERS.

Q. MR. PRESIDENT HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE EFFECTS OF THE DISUNITY AMONG THE NATIONALIST FACTIONS UPON THE PROSPECT FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND COULD YOU ALSO SAY WHICH FACTION, IN YOUR OPINION, DESERVES THE SUPPORT OF THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS, AND IF POSSIBLE, WHICH LEADER?

A. WE DON'T SUPPORT A FACTION AND THE PROBLEM OF UNITY IS OUR PROBLEM. WE'LL CONTINUE HELPING OUR BRETHREN TO BE MORE UNITED. BUT WE DON'T SUPPORT A FACTION. AND WE DISCOURAGE OTHERS FROM SUPPORTING FACTIONS.

Q. MR. PRESIDENT, IF I MAY PURSUE THE POINT, I'M SORRY I GOT YOUR ARM TWISTED WITH CUBA, BUT THE FACT REMAINS IF THERE IS NO RESOLUTION, WHAT WOULD BE THE POSITION OF THE FRONT-LINE STATES ABOUT CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST RHODESIA?

A. WHY CUBAN INVOLVEMENT? WHY DON'T WE TALK ABOUT CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOR A CHANGE. WHY, CUBA? WHY, CUBA, CUBA, CUBA? A TINY LITTLE STATE 90 MILES FROM THE BORDER OF THE UNITED STATES, THE MOST POWERFUL COUNTRY SINCE ADAM. (LAUGHTER) I FIND THE CUBA OBSESSION INCREDIBLE. AND IT COMES FROM INTELLIGENT PEOPLE. I REALLY DON'T UNDERSTAND. (LAUGHTER) CUBA CAN'T BE A COMPETITOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. HOW COULD IT BE? I DON'T UNDERSTAND THE THING AT ALL. I'M DULL.

Q. PERHAPS YOU CAN CLEAR IT UP FOR US BY EXPLAINING ...

A. YOU CLEAR IT UP FOR ME BECAUSE I'M THE ONE WHO WANTS TO UNDERSTAND. YOU EXPLAIN TO ME WHY INTELLIGENT PEOPLE ARE SO OBSESSED WITH CUBA? EXPLAIN TO ME. HOW, .. NO, I SHOULD,T GO ON (LAUGHTER)
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Q. TO CARRY ON WITH CUBA FOR THE MOMENT, CAN YOU SAY WHETHER YOU HAVE PRECISE INFORMATION ON WHEN THE SOUTH AFRICANS ENTERED ANGOLA AND WHEN THE CUBANS DID?

A. THE SOUTH AFRICANS ENTERED BEFORE THE 11TH OF NOVEMBER. PRECISELY WHEN, I DON'T KNOW. THEY ENTERED BEFORE THAT COUNTRY BECAME INDEPENDENT. PRECISELY WHEN I DON'T KNOW. BUT THEY DID.

Q. AND THE CUBANS?

A. THE CUBANS HAD TO BE ASKED BY AN INDEPENDENT STATE. AND THE PORTUGUESE COULD NOT HAVE INVITED THEM TO COME TO ANGOLA. THE PORTUGUESE WERE LEGALLY IN POWER. THEY COULD NOT HAVE INVITED THE CUBANS TO COME.

Q. (NEW YORK TIMES). COULD YOU GIVE US SOME MORE IDEAS ON WHO SHOULD ATTEND THIS MEETING TO DISCUSS NAMIBIA IN GENEVA THAT YOU REFER TO. OBVIOUSLY, YOU WANT SWAPO THERE AND I GATHER FROM YOUR COMMENTS THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE THERE. WOULD YOU ALSO

WANT THE PARTICIPANTS AT THE WINDHOEK CONFERENCE TO BE THERE AND OTHER AFRICAN STATES?

A. WE CERTAINLY DON'T WANT TO ATTEND A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE ON NAMIBIA. CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCES, AS WE UNDERSTAND THEM, USUALLY ARE, AS WE UNDERSTAND THEM, ARE BETWEEN THE COLONIAL POWER AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COLONY. THI IS WHAT I UNDERSTAND BY A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

Q. BUT YOU, EXCUSE ME, DO YOU ACCEPT SWAPO AS THE ONLY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COLONY OR JUST AS ONE OF SEVERAL?

A. WHEN YOU SAY YOU, WHOM DO YOU MEAN?

Q. I MEANT THE PRESIDENTS AND THE NATIONALIST LEADERS ...

A. WHAT PRESIDENTS? SWAPO IS RECOGNIZED BY THE OAU. IT IS ALSO RECOGNIZED BY THE UNITED NATIONS. THE UNITED NATIONS INCLUDES THE UNITED STATES. AND BRITIAN, AND FRANCE AND GERMANY. I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHICH OTHER ORGANIZATION IS ALSO, FROM NAMIBIA, IS ALSO RECOGNIZED BY THE UNITED NATIONS? WHICH OTHER ORGANIZATION IS ALSO FROM NAMIBIA, IS ALSO RECOGNIZED BY THE UNITED NATIONS?

THE UNITED NATIONS INCLUDES THE UNITED STATES AND OURSELVES. SO WHY ASK ABOUT OTHER ORGANIZATIONS BECAUSE UNCLASSIFIED

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WE DO RECOGNIZE AN ORGANIZATION, I THOUGHT ON THIS THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE.

Q. WELL THEN, YOU'R JUST SAYING JUST SWAPO AND SOUTH AFRICA?

A. WHAT WOULD YOU LIKE IT TO BE?

Q. IT'S NOT FOR ME, MR. PRESIDENT...

A. IT'S NOT FOR ME EITHER, BUT I'M SAYING ...

Q. SOME PEOPLE MIGHT SUGGEST THAT SOME OF THE REPRESENTATIVES WHO HAVE BEEN MEETING IN WINDHOEK AND HAVE PRODUCED SOME RESULTS WHICH SEEM IN THE DIRECTION YOU'RE HEADING, SHOULD ALSO BE ENTITLED ...

A. WOULD YOU LIKE SOUTH AFRICA TO NOMINATE ... A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AS I UNDERSTAND IT IS BETWEEN THE COLONIAL POWER AND THE PEOPLE OF THE COUNTRY CONCERNED. WOULD YOU LIKE SOUTH AFRICA TO NOMINATE THE REPRESENTATIVES OF NAMIBIA?

Q. NO, BUT PERHAPS THE ...

A. NO, I'M ASKING YOU, DO YOU REALLY EXPECT SOUTH AFRICA TO NOMINATE, TO DETERMINE, WHO THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA ARE? WILL SWAPO WANT TO DETERMINE WHAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION IS GOING TO CONSIST OF?

Q. MR. PRESIDENT, SEVERAL TIMES DURING THIS PRESS CONFERENCE YOU MENTIONED YOU ARE LESS HOPEFUL THAN BEFORE ON

NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA, LESS ENCOURAGED, IS THAT BECAUSE OF THE SIMPLE PASSAGE OF TIME OR HAVE DR. KISSINGER'S PROBINGS SO FAR SHOWN THE SITUATION TO BE WORSE THEN YOU THOUGHT IT WAS BEFORE?

A. I DON'T KNOW HOW I ANSER THIS AGAIN BY ... I AM SAYING COMPLETELY FRANKLY, AS A RESULT OF THE DISCUSSIONS I'VE HAD WITH DR. KISSINGER, I CAN'T SAY I FEEL MORE HOPEFUL THAN I FELT BEFORE. I DON'T KNOW WHAT MORE I CAN SAY.

Q. MY QUESTION WAS WHY? WHY IS THAT? WHAT PRECISELY IS IT? IS IT SIMPLY BECAUSE TIME HAS PASSED OR HAS HE FOUND OUT SOMETHING YOU DIDN'T REALIZE BEFORE?

A. I'VE NOT RECEIVED ANY INFORMATION WHICH MAKES ME MORE HOPEFUL. PERHAPS I MIGHT RECEIVE MORE INFORMATION, I DON'T KNOW.

Q. (WASHINGTON POST). IN THE STATEMENT YESTERDAY, SIR, UNCLASSIFIED

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EMPHASIS WAS PUT ON THE LACT OF UNITY AMONG THE ZIMBABWE LIBERATION FORCES. BECAUSE OF THAT SITUATON, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN NOW IF, FOR EXAMPLE, SMITH BY SOME MIRACLE, WERE TO SAY, YES, HE AGREED TO MAJORITY RULE? WOULD THE LIBERATION FORCES SOMEHOW AND, IF SO, HOW, BE ABLE TO COMPOSE THEMSELVES TO FORM A GOVERNMENT? SECONDLY, HAVE YOU RECEIVED A PROPOSAL FROM THE UNITED STATES SUGGESTING THAT WITHIN TWO MONTHS THERE WOULD BE A REMOVAL OF THE SMITH GOVERNMENT AND, IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED SUCH A PROPOSAL, DOES THAT CAUSE YOU SOME CONCERN OR OR SATISFACTION?

A. TO ANSWER THE SECOND QUESTION FIRST, I'VE RECEIVED NO INFORMATION FROM THE UNITED STATES THAT SMITH IS GOING TO BE OUT OF THE WAYIN TWO MONTHS TIME. NONE WHATSOEVER. TO ANSER THAT FIRST QUESTION, I PREFER TO CALL ... THE NAMIBIANS, THE RHODESIANS, WHETHER UNITED OR NOT, THEY'RE FIGHTING FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF THEIR COUNTRY. IF SMITH WERE TO FALL, IT WOULD BE COMPLETELY RIDICULOUS IF THEY COULDN'T COME TOGETHER AND FORM A GOVERNMENT. I WOULDN'T KNOW HOW THEY COME TOGETHER BUT I SUPPOSE THEY WOULD HAVE TO COME TOGETHER AND FORM A GOVERNMENT. OTHERWISE, THEY WOULD LOOK EXTREMELY RIDICULOUS.

Q. MR. PRESIDENT, COULD YOU GIVE US YOUR REACTIO TT A PLAN TO COMPENSATE WHITES IN RHODESIA FINANCIALLY EITHER FOR STAYING OR FOR LEAVING?

A. MY OWN IDEA WAS FOR LEAVING. I'M QUITE SERIOUS ON THIS ONE. I MADE THE SUGGESTION THAT FOR THOE WHO ARE INTERSTED IN SHORTENING THE WAR, A POSSIBLE METHOD IS TO DEAL WITH THOSE PEOPLE LIKE SMITH AND HIS SUPPORTERS WHO ARE IN RHODESIA ONLY BECAUSE THERE IS MINORITY RULE. BUT WHEN MAJORITY RULE COMES, THEY WILL GO. IN THE MEANTIME THEY JUST FIGHT. SO INSTEAD

OF TALKING ABOUT GUARANTEES FOR THE MINORITIES IN GNERAL
TERMS, WHY DON'T WE ASK OURSELVES WHICH MINORITES THOSE
WHO WANT TO STAY, I BELIEVE, IN THE FIRST PLACE, ARE GOING TO
BE PROBABLY VERY FEW, THOSE WHO ACTUALLY WANT TO
STAY. SO RELLY IF YOU WANTED TO SHORTEN THE WAR,
YOU SAY TO THOSE PEOPLE WHO DON'T ACCEPT MAJORITY RULE,
COME OUT, COME OUT. WE'LL PAY YOU AND WE'LL GET YOU
SOMEWHERE ELSE TO STAY. SO THEY'LL GET OUT.
THE OTHERS WHO WANT TO STAY, I BELIEVE MYSELF, A SMALL
MINORITY WILL WANT TO STAY, USUALLY THOSE WHO WANT
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TO STAY DON'T WANT GUARANTEES. USUALLY THEY DON'T WANT
THEM. THEY DON'T WANT GUARANTEES TO STAY. AND IF THEY
WANT GUARANTEES TO STAY, THEY ASKE THOSE GUARANTEES
FROM THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT. FROM THEGOVERNMENT OF THEIR
COUNTRY. THEY WOULDN'T ASK FROM THE UNITED STATES OR
FROM BRITAIN. THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT GIVE THEM GUARANTEES.
THEY WOULD GET THOSE GUARANTEES FROM THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF
THE COUNTRY. I SAY USUALLY THEY DON'T ASK FOR GUARANTEES. BUT
SHOULD THEY ASK GUARANTEES, THEY WILL PROBALLY ASK THEIR
GOVERNMENT AND THIS WOULD COME OUT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
TALKS. BUT IN THE MEANTIME, THE HARD LINERS WHO
DON'T ACCEPT THE MAJORITY RULE, WOULD HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED
TO GET OUT AS QUICLY AS POSSIBLE. BECAUSE THE LONGER THEY
STAY, THE LONGER THE WAR GOES ON. THIS IS MY SUGGESTION.
I STILL SAY THEY SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO GO, THOSE WHO
ARE SIMPLY FIGHTING BECAUSE THEY WANT TO MAINTAIN MAJORITY (SIC)
RULE. THEY SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO GO. THIS IS MY
VIEW OF COMPENSATION. THOSE WHO REMAIN, IF THEY WANT
GUARANTEES, THOSE WOULD COME OUT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
TALKS.

Q. MR. PRESIDNET IN VIEW OF YOUR DISAPPOINTMENT OR
SENSE OF DISCOURAGEMENT ABOUT THE TALKS SO FAR THAT SECRETARY'S
KISSINGER'S TRAVELS OVER THE NEW FEW DAYS WILL IN ANY WAY PRODUCE
ANY INFORMATION THAT WILL BOOST YOUR SPIRITS OR GIVE
YOU ANY SENSE OF ENCOURAGEMENT OR DO YOU SEE SIMPLY A
SHUTTLE OF FAILURE?

A. OH NO, NO, NO. NOT NECESSARILY, A SHUTTLE OF
CLARITY IS NOT NECESSARILY A SHUTTLE OF FAILURE. IF THE
SHUTTLE CLARIFIES THE ISSUES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, I WOULD REALLY
LIKE THE UNITED STATES TO INFORM ITSELF ON THE PROBLEMS OF
SOUTHERN AFRICA. IF BY INFORMING ITSELF, IT IS POSSIBLE TO
ALSO TO ACHIEVE INDEPENDENCE PEACEFULLY, QUICKLY,
FINE. BUT EVEN IF IT ONLY ENABLES THE
UNITED STATES TO UNDERSTAND THE INTRANSIGENCE OF
THE MAJORITIES AND THE MINORITIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA,
IT WILL NOT BE A USELESS SHUTTLE.

Q. MR. PRESIDENT MAY I FOLLOW THAT UP. IS IT YOUR FEELING
THAT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THAT IF THE WAR SHOULD INTENSIFY, THAT

YOU WOULD EXPECT THE UNITED STATES TO COME TO THE SIDE OF
THE WHITE MINORITIES, TO THE DEGREE THAT THAT KIND OF
SUPPORT IS POSSIBLE?

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A. I'M SAYING I HOPE THIS SHUTTLE, IF IT DOES NOT END IN
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, AND THEREFORE THE WAR HAS TO
GO ON, AT LEAST IT WIL HAVE MADE THE UNITED STATES
UNDERSTAND THAT THE FIGHTING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA HAS NOTHING
TO DO WITH COMMUNISM. AND THEREFORE THEY WILL NOT WANT
TO BE ALLIES OF THE RACISTS THERE. AND IN THAT CASE IT WILL HAVE
ACHIEVED A LOT.

Q. (GERMAN TV). SIR, SINCE THE FIRST VISIT OF DR. KISSINGER TO
DAR ES SALAAM, SOWETO HAS HAPPENED. SO MY FIRST QUESTION IS,
DID YOU NOT TALK OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PROBLEM AT ALL,
AND MY SECOND QUESTION IS DO YOU EXPECT DR. KISSINGER
BACK IN DAR-ES-SALAAM SOMETIME NEXT WEEK?

A. I DID NOT RAISE SOUTH AFRICA. I'M SAYING, I'VE
BEEN TALKING ABOUT NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA AND YOU
WILL UNDERSTAND IT'S NOT BECAUSE I'M NOT CONCERNED ABOUT
SOUTH AFRICA. YES, SECOND QUESTION, YE. I DO EXPECT
DR. KISSINGER BACK.

Q. IS IT YOUR EXPERIENCE THAT ...PARAPHRASE:
INVIEW OF YOUR EXPERIENCE THUS FAR, DO YOU THINK THERE'S
ANY MOVEMENT COMING OUT OF THE INTERVENTION OF DR. KISSINGER?).

A. IF I THOUGHT THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF GOOD
COMING OUT OF HIS INTERVENTION, I WOULD NOT HAVE WELCOMED
HIM TO DAR ES SALAAM. I THINK I HAVE MADE THAT QUITE CLEAR.

Q. MR. PRESIDENT, THANK YOU VERY MUCH. SPAIN
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